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INTRODUCTION
At the end of the often long road of litigation, when one side is
found liable for the other's damages, only one prejudgment question
remains that truly matters: how much recovery should the victor
receive? In the context of patent law, Federal Circuit opinions over the
past five years suggest a distinct trend toward limiting the discretion
afforded to patent damages experts when opining on recovery. In
response, both patentees and accused infringers should prepare to
muster more detailed and concrete damages models. Those models
must fit and candidly address the facts of each case. As for using
historical licensing activity to calculate royalties, a threshold showing
of factual comparability appears to be the new norm before experts can
rely on prior agreements on the asserted patent or comparable
technology. Likewise, the circumstances in which patentees can
successfully invoke the entire-market-value rule have shrunk
progressively. And while those litigation trends are apparent to
practitioners, other trends are just now coming into focus.
Until recently, the Federal Circuit emphasized apportionment of
the royalty base-as opposed to the royalty rate-when calculating
reasonable royalties. To many practitioners, it was "All About That
Bas[e]" when crafting damages arguments.' In a series of opinions
issued in late 2014, the Federal Circuit dispelled that notion by
clarifying that apportionment through a royalty base and a royalty rate
is permissible so long as "the ultimate combination of royalty base and
royalty rate .. . reflect[s] the value attributable to the infringing features
of the product, and no more."2
1. MEGHAN TRAINOR, All About That Bass, on TITLE (Epic 2014).
2. Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc., 773 F.3d 1201, 1226 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ("When the
accused infringing products have both patented and unpatented features, measuring this value
requires a determination of the value added by such features. Indeed, apportionment is required
even for non-royalty forms of damages: a jury must ultimately 'apportion the defendant's profits
and the patentee's damages between the patented feature and the unpatented features' using
'reliable and tangible' evidence. Logically, an economist could do this in various ways-by
careful selection of the royalty base to reflect the value added by the patented feature, where that
differentiation is possible; by adjustment of the royalty rate so as to discount the value of a
product's non-patented features; or by a combination thereof." (citation omitted)); see also
VimetX, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 767 F.3d 1308, 1327-28 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ("Where the smallest
salable unit is, in fact, a multi-component product containing several non-infringing features with
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While some commentators have questioned the difficulty that
these opinions place on patentees when trying to prove damages,' the
beauty of this caselaw lies in an advocate's ability to tame the chaos
and reach a palatable argument. In Getting to Maybe, a classic law
school primer, Professors Richard Michael Fischl and Jeremy Paul
teach that students should strive to become comfortable with
uncertainty when confronting law school exams because the very
nature of legal analysis is not about reaching the correct answer as
much as it is about recognizing that ambiguous situations necessarily
demand a nuanced approach.4 Perhaps lessons learned long ago can
galvanize effective advocacy moving forward.
This paper argues that, by broadening the concept of how to
apportion royalties, the Federal Circuit's recent jurisprudence
strengthens the patent system by providing advocates with greater
latitude to advance damages theories within the confines of the claimed
invention. In three parts, this paper introduces the concept of
reasonable royalties in patent litigation,' highlights the evolution of
caselaw in this area, 6 and explains why the Federal Circuit's most
recent holistic approach toward calculating royalties provides parties
with greater certainty when litigating damages.' At bottom, as each
appellate opinion clarified upon release, reasonable royalties must be,
quite simply, reasonable and realistic in light of the facts and
circumstances of each case-and nothing more.
no relation to the patented feature (as VimetX claims it was here), the patentee must do more to
estimate what portion of the value of that product is attributable to the patented technology. To
hold otherwise would permit the entire market value exception to swallow the rule of
apportionment.").
3. See, e.g., Matt Jorgenson & Bryan Blumenkopf, 4 Reasons GCs Are Cautious About
Filing Patent Cases, LAW 360 (Oct. 23, 2014, 10:19 A.M. ET), http://www.law360.com/articles
/586599/4-reasons-gcs-are-cautious-about-filing-patent-suits ("Although since largely reversed,
this case demonstrates the uncertainties in establishing damages evidence and theories that will
pass muster under still-evolving legal standards."); Susan Decker, VirnetX to Vringo's Lost
Millions Show Patent Peril, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Sept. 17, 2014, 9:00 P.M. PDT),
http://www.bloomberg.comf/news/articles/2014-09-16/vimetx-to-vringo-s-lost-millions-show-pat
ent-peril ("Those decisions are among recent cases illustrating patent owners' challenges making
money from royalty payments and litigation instead of manufacturing products.").
4. RICHARD MICHAEL FISCHL & JEREMY PAUL, GETTING TO MAYBE: How To EXCEL ON
LAW SCHOOL EXAMS passim (1999).
5. See infra Part 1.
6. See infra Part IL
7. See infra Part Ill.
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I. AN OVERVIEW OF REASONABLE ROYALTIES
Section 284 of the Patent Act provides for an award of
reasonable royalties upon a finding of infringement: "Upon finding for
the claimant the court shall award the claimant damages adequate to
compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable
royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer, together with
interest and costs as fixed by the court."'
So even when patentees cannot prove lost profits (or other actual
damages), they are still entitled to damages that cannot be less than a
reasonable royalty for the use of the invention by the infringer.' This is
the most common measure of damages used by entities that do not
practice the patent by making, using, or selling products. A reasonable
royalty reflects the minimum amount that the patentee and infringer
would have agreed to in the absence of a lawsuit.'o A patentee bears the
burden of proving the nature and amount of damages necessary to
compensate for the infringement."
A. Running Royalties versus Lump-Sum Awards
A reasonable royalty award can take a variety of forms, including
a lump-sum payment, a running royalty based on a percentage of
revenues, a running-per-unit royalty based on sales, or some
combination of those structures.1 2 The varied payment structures carry
significant and fundamental differences. 3 When a running royalty is
adopted by the court, the amount awarded is tied to the extent of the
infringer's use of the claimed invention and fluctuates with future sales
or use.' 4 Thus, running royalties typically assign most of the risk to the
8. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2013).
9. See Bandag, Inc. v. Gerrard Tire Co., 704 F.2d 1578, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1983) ("[A]
reasonable royalty, when it can be determined, and which may be equivalent to an established
royalty, is merely the floor below which damages shall not fall.").
10. See Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2009), cert.
denied, 130 S. Ct. 3324 (2010) ("[Tjhe hypothetical negotiation or the 'willing licensor-willing
licensee' approach, attempts to ascertain the royalty upon which the parties would have agreed
had they successfully negotiated an agreement just before infringement began.").
11. See Dow Chem. Co. v. Mee Indus., 341 F.3d 1370, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
12. See Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1326; VirnetX, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 767 F.3d 1308, 1326
("A reasonable royalty may be a lump-sum payment not calculated on a per unit basis, but it may
also be, and often is, a running payment that varies with the number of infringing units.").
13. See Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1326 ("Significant differences exist between a running royalty
license and a lump-sum license.").
14. See id.
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patentee-licensor because payments are not guaranteed.'"
Comparatively, lump-sum royalties allocate risks differently by
providing patentees with an immediate and guaranteed infusion of cash
while allowing infringers to cap their liability notwithstanding the
extent of their infringing use.16 Lump-sum royalties have the added
advantage of eliminating the administrative burden of monitoring
usage and supervising periodic payments.' 7 Even so, for a licensee, the
lump-sum approach carries the disadvantage of a required financial
expenditure, regardless of the actual useful lifespan of the technology.' 8
This concern is germane to industries where the technology rapidly
evolves and frequently improves, or where obsolescence is
commonplace. On the other side, the patentee also runs the risk that the
claimed technology is one of those rare inventions with an extended
useful lifespan and greater-than-anticipated actual market value.' 9 So
the patentee leaves money on the table under that scenario.
Putting aside pragmatic rationales on which model is more
advantageous, in actual practice, the extent of accused infringement is
generally known at the time of litigation, and the parties generally
select the royalty structure most favorable to their position. These
strategic decisions are subject to only a few additional considerations,
such as a party's historical practice of using a particular royalty
structure or any actual negotiations between the parties regarding
similar inventions.
All things being equal, patentees still tend to seek a running
royalty based on actual accused sales, while many large companies
sued as defendants (especially those in industries where products are
often covered by many patents, such as semiconductors and computers)
prefer the lump-sum approach. As illustrated in Interactive Pictures
Corp. v. Infinite Pictures, Inc. 20 a lump-sum award can be minor in
comparison to the enticement of running royalties. There, the Federal
Circuit affirmed a lump-sum damages award of a relatively small
15. See id ("Royalties are dependent on the level of sales or usage by the licensee, which
the licensee can often control.").
16. See id ("A lump-sum license removes any risk that the licensee using the patented
invention will underreport, e.g., engage in false reporting, and therefore underpay, as can occur
with a running royalty agreement.").
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. See id. ("The licensed technology may be wildly successful, and the licensee may have
acquired the technology for far less than what later proved to be its economic value.").
20. 274 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
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value-$1 million, the lower end of the range sought by the patentee-
which was based on the patentee's use of a 10% rate applied to the
defendant's projections covering the damages period.2 '
In short, determining the appropriate reasonable royalty structure
in any given case largely depends on the particular factual scenario,
available information, and the historical practices and negotiations of
the parties.
B. Calculating Reasonable Royalties: Georgia-Pacific and
Comparability
No single methodology completely dominates or defines how to
calculate reasonable royalty damages. And while many methodologies
can be used to determine a reasonable royalty, the hypothetical
negotiation framework in particular has been endorsed implicitly by the
Federal Circuit and is the most commonly used method.22 This analysis
was set forth in the seemingly timeless case Georgia-Pacific Corp. v.
United States Plywood Corp., a 1971 decision from the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of New York.23 In Georgia-Pacific, the
court envisioned that a reasonable royalty award could be calculated
through a "hypothetical negotiation" between a "willing licensor" (the
patent owner) and a "willing licensee" (the infringer) at the time
infringement began. 24 The Georgia-Pacific approach assumes that, at
the time of the hypothetical negotiation, both parties agree that the
patent is valid and infringed.25 It considers 15 factors to arrive at the
product of the hypothetical negotiation. The famous Georgia-Pacific
factors follow below:
(1) [R]oyalties the patentee has received for licensing the patent to
others; (2) rates paid by the licensee for the use of comparable
patents; (3) the nature and scope of the license (exclusive or
nonexclusive, restricted or nonrestricted by territory or product
type); (4) any established policies or marketing programs by the
licensor to maintain its patent monopoly by not licensing others to
use the invention or granting licenses under special conditions to
maintain the monopoly; (5) the commercial relationship between the
licensor and licensee, such as whether they are competitors; (6) the
effect of selling the patented specialty in promoting sales of other
21. See Interactive Pictures, 274 F.3d at 1384-86.
22. See Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1324-25.
23. See Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120-21
(S.D.N.Y. 1970), modified & af'd, 446 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 870 (1971).
24. Id. at 1121.
25. See Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1325.
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products of the licensee; (7) the duration of the patent and license
term; (8) the established profitability of the product made under the
patent, including its commercial success and current popularity; (9)
the utility and advantages of the patent property over old modes or
devices; (10) the nature of the patented invention and the benefits to
those who have used the invention; (11) the extent to which the
infringer has used the invention and the value of that use; (12) the
portion of profit or of the selling price that may be customary in that
particular business to allow for use of the invention or analogous
inventions; (13) the portion of the realizable profit that should be
credited to the invention as opposed to its non-patented elements;
(14) the opinion testimony of qualified experts; and (15) the results
of a hypothetical negotiation between the licensor and licensee. 26
Of the Georgia-Pacific factors, comparable license agreements
have drawn recentjudicial attention.2 7 On comparability, past licensing
agreements are probative to establish a reasonable royalty rate under
certain carefully delineated circumstances. Courts consider "the rates
paid by the licensee for the use of other patents comparable to the
patent-in-suit,"2 and examine whether "the licenses relied on by the
patentee in proving damages are sufficiently comparable to the
hypothetical license at issue."2 9 "Actual licenses to the patented
technology are highly probative" and "most clearly reflect the
economic value of the patented technology in the marketplace";
whereas a damages case "untethered from the patented technology at
issue . . . [is] arbitrary and speculative."30 Technological irrelevance
and arbitrary use appear to be the considerations that most consistently
lead to a finding that a license is not comparable." In contrast, the
relative date of the license may be the least influential, though the
Federal Circuit has upheld the exclusion of licenses on that basis in the
past.32
As an example of comparable licensing under less-than-perfect
circumstances, in Finjan Inc. v. Secure Computing Corp., the Federal
26. i4i Ltd. P'ship v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831, 853 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2010), affd, 131 S.
Ct. 2238 (2011) (citing Georgia-Pacific, 318 F. Supp. at 20).
27. See Versata Software, Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 717 F.3d 1255, 1268 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
28. Georgia-Pacific, 318 F. Supp.at 1120.
29. Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1325.
30. LaserDynamics, Inc. v. Quanta Computer, Inc., 694 F.3d 51, 79, 81 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
31. See, e.g., ResQNet.com, Inc. v. Lansa, Inc., 594 F.3d 860, 869-70 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (per
curiam); Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1328-29.
32. Compare LaserDynamics, 694 F.3d at 80-81, with ActiveVideo Networks, Inc. v.
Verizon Commc'ns, Inc., 694 F.3d 1312, 1332-33 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
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Circuit upheld a running royalty damages award based on a lump-sum
portfolio license.33 There, Finjan's damages expert adequately
"account[ed] for differences in the technologies and economic
circumstances" of the portfolio license during testimony by explaining
to the jury the different relationships between the parties, the
differences in royalty forms, and the additional value Finjan received
under the portfolio license that was not relevant to the hypothetical
license.34 On the flipside, as demonstrated by the decision in Wordtech
Systems, Inc. v. Integrated Networks Solutions, Inc., failing to account
for the details in less-than-ideal circumstances comes at the peril of
exclusion.35 There, the Federal Circuit reversed a small lump-sum
damages award where past licensing agreements-2 lump-sum
licenses and 11 running royalty licenses to some or all of the patents-
in-suit-were offered at trial.36 Though the jury's damages award was
roughly the average of the two lump-sum agreements, the court
nonetheless concluded that the evidence did not support the verdict
because there was no basis to compare the actual value of those licenses
to the case at hand.37 Thus, the "licenses offered the jury 'little more
than a recitation of royalty numbers."'38
As those cases demonstrate, damages experts must adequately
account for the factual differences among past license agreements
relied upon in their reasonable royalty calculations.3 9 To craft a cogent
argument, a candid and thorough review of any relevant agreements is
necessary. Mirror-image licenses to the patent-in-suit are not required,
but accounting for all the differences leading to a proposed damages
amount is required. Also, in close cases, arguing that a lack of
comparability goes to evidentiary weight may ultimately save
admissibility.40 This reconciliation of the caselaw is consistent with
Judge Kathleen O'Malley's guidance below:
33. See Finjan, Inc. v. Secure Computing Corp., 626 F.3d 1197, 1211-12 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
34. Id.; see also Multimedia Patent Trust v. Apple Inc., No. 10-CV-2618-H (KSC), 2012
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 165928, at *28 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2012) (allowing reliance on "different"
licenses where the expert "acknowledge[d] the differences" and "explain[ed] how these
differences do or do not affect his reasonable royalty calculation").
35. See Wordtech Sys., Inc. v. Integrated Networks Solutions, Inc., 609 F.3d 1308, 1319-
22 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
36. Id. at 1320.
37. Id.
38. Id. (citation omitted).
39. See also Ericsson Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc., 773 F.3d 1201, 1227 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
40. See ActiveVideo Networks, Inc. v. Verizon Cotmnc'ns, Inc., 694 F.3d 1312, 1333 (Fed.
Cir. 2012) (holding that the differences between the licenses at issue were questions of weight and
"factual issues best addressed by cross examination and not by exclusion").
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We do not require that witnesses use any or all of the Georgia-
Pacific factors when testifying about damages in patent cases. If
they choose to use them, however, reciting each factor and making
a conclusory remark about its impact on the damages calculation
before moving on does not more than tell the jury what factors a
damages analysis could take into consideration. Expert witnesses
should concentrate on fully analyzing the applicable factors, not
cursorily reciting all fifteen. And, while mathematical precision is
not required, some explanation of both why and generally to what
extent the particular factor impacts the royalty calculation is needed.
... "[S]uperficial testimony" and the simple recitation of royalty
numbers that happen to be in the ballpark of the jury's award will
not support the jury's award when no analysis is offered to the jury
which would allow them to evaluate the probative value of those
numbers.4 1
Taken together, the comparability requirement may be driven, in
part, by a desire for more concrete and detailed damages analyses that
are specifically tailored to the particular facts of each case. Although
there are no categorical rules in determining comparability, patentees
and accused infringers should be mindful of the need to thoroughly
analyze the licenses that each side believes are relevant and
advantageous. Consideration also should be given to third-party
discovery where the number of infringing sales covered by a particular
license is likely to be a key issue or where a lump-sum license must be
analogized to a running royalty (or vice versa). Given this fact-
intensive analysis, at trial, arguments and defenses should be marshaled
early on and succinctly presented to the jury to avoid penalties for
exceeding time restrictions placed on the parties by the court.
In view of the varying methods to arrive at reasonable royalties
disputes often center on the threshold inquiry of where to start the
calculations because, from there, a party's resulting exposure
necessarily follows. Over the past five years, the Federal Circuit has
been attentive in this area.
II. 2009 To 2013: ANCHORING REASONABLE ROYALTIES
At the heart of calculating reasonable royalties is where to begin-
both at the royalty base and royalty rate. As early as 1884, federal
courts have held fidelity to the following mantra:
41. Whitserve, LLC v. Computer Packages, Inc., 694 F.3d 10, 31-32 (Fed. Cir. 2012), cert.
denied, 133 S. Ct. 1291 (2013) (citations omitted).
2015] 591
SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.. V
[T]he patentee . . . must in every case give evidence tending to
separate or apportion the defendant's profits and the patentee's
damages between the patented feature and the unpatented features,
and such evidence must be reliable and tangible, and not conjectural
or speculative," or show that "the entire value of the whole machine,
as a marketable article, is properly and legally attributable to the
patented feature. 4 2
Under a concept later articulated as the entire-market-value rule,
a narrow exception to the rule of apportionment, "[a] patentee may
assess damages based on the entire market value of the accused product
only where the patented feature creates the basis for customer demand
or substantially creates the value of the component parts."4 if
established, the damages calculation may roll up the value of the
product as a whole. Otherwise, the damages calculation can take into
account only the value of the patented feature as a subset of the market
price. So the path to rags or riches is embedded in the concepts of
whether the patentee can latch onto the entire market value of the
infringing product or, failing that, how much the patentee can apportion
as attributable to the patented invention. Starting in 2009, the Federal
Circuit took up these old concepts with fresh interest.
A. Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Gateway, Inc.-Basis for
Demand
In Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., the Federal Circuit
held that patented features must be the basis of demand to invoke the
entire-market-value rule." Decided in 2009, the Federal Circuit
considered an appeal by Microsoft about the denial of post-trial
motions following a lump-sum jury award of more than $350 million
for infringement. 45 The lawsuit involved a single patent relating to a
method for entering information into a field on a computer screen by
selecting an option from a menu of information or otherwise using
predefined tools to input the information." Microsoft argued that,
42. Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citing
Garretson v. Clark, Ill U.S. 120, 121 (1884)).
43. SynQor, Inc. v. Artesyn Techs., Inc., 709 F.3d 1365, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (quoting
Uniloc, 632 F.3d at 1318).
44. See Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
45. Id. at 1309.
46. Id. at 1310-12.
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among other things, the jury award should be vacated because the jury
applied improperly the entire-market-value rule.47
Noting that it would be legal error if the jury relied on overall
product values when calculating the award, the appellate panel
reiterated that invocation of the entire-market-value rule requires the
patentee to prove that "the patent-related feature is the 'basis for
customer demand."'4 8 According to Chief Judge Redmond Michel,49 if
that standard is not met, the patentee must present "reliable and
tangible" evidence "tending to separate or apportion the defendant's
profits and the patentee's damages between the patented feature and
the unpatented features."o Ultimately, the evidence did not support the
use of the entire-market-value rule because the patentee failed to prove
that the accused date-picker feature was "the basis-or even a
substantial basis-of the consumer demand for [Microsoft's] Outlook
[email service]."' The tool was merely a minor feature in a larger
software program, and there was no evidence that any consumer ever
purchased Outlook because of the accused functionality.52 The court
also found that application of the entire-market-value rule was
improper because the expert's royalty-calculation approach set the
royalty base as the price of the software program but increased the
royalty rate from 1% to 8%. 3 Foreshadowing opinions to come in
2014, although the court suggested that this approach could be
acceptable in some cases, it was not appropriate in this context because
there was no evidence to support the 8% rate and no reliable
"account[ing] for the proportion of the base represented by the
infringing component or feature."54
47. Id. at 1336.
48. Id. (citations omitted).
49. Judge Michel served as Chief Judge of U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
until 2010. Paul Redmond Michel, Biographical Entry in History of the Federal Judiciary, FED.
JUDICIAL CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetinfo?jid=1633&cid-999 (last visited June 26,
2015).
50. Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1337 (citations omitted).
51. Id. at 1337-38.
52. Id
53. Id. at 1338.
54. Id at 1338-39. On remand, a new jury trial on damages resulted in a lump-sum award
of $70 million for Lucent, despite Lucent's admission that the entire-market-value rule was not
satisfied. Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 837 F. Supp. 2d 1107, 1110, 1117 (S.D. Cal.
2011). The district court subsequently granted in part Microsoft's motion for judgment as a matter
of law and reduced the award to $26.3 million. Id. at 1127. Specifically, the court concluded that
Lucent's expert failed to properly apportion the revenue generated by Microsoft Office to reflect
the value of Outlook within the bundle and therefore overstated the eligible royalty base. Id. at
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B. Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.-Entire Market Value
Is Not a Reference Point by Itself
In addition to jettisoning the infamous 25% rule of thumb for
calculating baseline royalty rates, in Uniloc USA, Inc., v. Microsoft
Corp., the Federal Circuit also rejected two analytical arguments that
seemingly attempted to circumvent the requirements of the entire-
market-value rule. At trial, there was no dispute that the accused
technology (a registration program for deterring illegal copying of
software) did not drive customer demand and that the entire-market-
value rule did not apply.56 Undaunted, Uniloc's damages expert opined
that a $2.50 per unit royalty was appropriate, and the expert testified
that the amount was reasonable because it represented 2.9% of the
$19.8 billion in total revenue generated by the accused versions of
Microsoft Office and Microsoft Windows.57
First, Uniloc relied on the following language from Lucent to
argue that, if the royalty rate is sufficiently small, the entire market
value of a product can be used as the royalty base: "Simply put, the
base used in a running royalty calculation can always be the value of
the entire commercial embodiment, as long as the magnitude of the rate
is within an acceptable range." 8
The panel discarded that contention because, according to Judge
Richard Linn, the passage from Lucent was taken out of context and
had to be read in view of the language reiterating the requirement of
proving that the patented invention is the basis for consumer demand. 9
Failing that, Uniloc resorted to characterizing the reference to
overall product revenues as a "reasonableness check" only, and not as
the expert's actual damages calculation.o The Federal Circuit rejected
that argument as well, stating that "the fact that the entire market value
was brought in as only a 'check' is of no moment" because "[t]he
disclosure that a company has made $19 billion dollars in revenue . . .
1119-22. The court also held that consumer surveys regarding use, reasons for purchase, and time-
savings associated with the date-picker feature were admissible to demonstrate the relative value
of the accused feature within Outlook. Id. at 1122-24. The case later settled.
55. See Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1315, 1318-19, 1321 (Fed.
Cir. 2011).
56. Id. at 1318-19.
57. Id. at 1311, 1318.
58. Id. at 1319-20 (quoting Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1338-39).
59. Id
60. Id. at 1318.
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cannot help but skew the damages horizon for the jury."6 1 Accordingly,
the panel affirmed the district court's grant of a new trial on damages.62
C. LaserDynamics, Inc. v. Quanta Computer, Inc.-Smallest
Salable Patent-Practicing Unit Reaffirmed for Multi-
Component Products
In LaserDynamics, Inc. v. Quanta Computer Inc., the Federal
Circuit held that, when patented features not do drive consumer
motivation to purchase a multi-component product, the smallest salable
patent-practicing unit must be used as the base for royalty
calculations.63 There, a Texas jury awarded $52 million in royalties for
a patent involving a method of automatic optical disc discrimination in
an optical disc drive ("ODD").' That amount was consistent with
LaserDynamics' damages expert.65 After the trial, the district court set
aside the award based on the improper invocation of the entire-market-
value rule.66 A second trial on damages was held and resulted in a lump-
sum award of $8.5 million. 67 LaserDynamics cross-appealed both the
district court's finding that the rule was improperly invoked in the first
trial and its grant of a new trial. 8 In both rulings, the trial court found
that the patentee had presented no evidence that the claimed invention
drove demand and, "[a]t best, . . .[demonstrated] that almost all
computers sold in the retail market include optical disc drives and that
customers would be hesitant to purchase computers without an optical
disc drive." 69
Recognizing the complexities of isolating the value of a single
component in modem multifunction products, the Federal Circuit
61. Id. at 1320-21. The Federal Circuit has since limited the Uniloc holding by recently
declining to rule that any reference to an infringer's total sales is unfairly prejudicial and taints
the jury verdict such that a new trial is required. See Synqor, Inc. v. Artesyn Techs., Inc., 709 F.3d
1365, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2013). The appellate court concluded that the district court did not abuse its
discretion by admitting evidence of the defendants' $20 billion in product sales because that figure
was offered only to prove that the price elasticity of demand would be high-not to justify a
damages calculation. Id.
62. Uniloc, 632 F.3d at 1321.
63. LaserDynamics, Inc. v. Quanta Computer, Inc., 694 F.3d 51, 56, 63 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
64. Id. at 56-63.
65. Id.
66. Id at 63.
67. Id. at 64-65.
68. Id. at 65-66.
69. LaserDynamics, Inc. v. Quanta Computer, Inc., No. 2:06-CV-348-TJW-CE, 2010 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 56634, at *3 (E.D. Tex. June 9, 2010), affid, 694 F.3d 51 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
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acknowledged that apportioning value between patented and non-
patented components "can be an exceedingly difficult and error-prone
task."70 Nonetheless, reviewing the district court's findings, the
appellate court agreed that LaserDynamics' damages expert had
improperly applied the entire-market-value rule, noting that "[w]hether
called 'product value apportionment' or anything else, the fact remains
that the royalty was expressly calculated as a percentage of the entire
market value of a laptop computer rather than a patent-practicing ODD
alone." 7 1 Writing for the panel, Judge Jimmie V. Reyna expounded that
even proof of the following is insufficient to invoke the entire-market-
value rule: (1) that the patented feature is "valuable, important, or even
essential" to the product; (2) that the product without the patented
feature is commercially unviable; and (3) that consumers do not want
products lacking the patented technology.7 2
According to Judge Reyna, a "higher degree of proof. .. must
exist to support an entire market value rule theory."' Specifically, the
patented feature must be "what motivate[d] consumers to buy" a
particular product.74 The court also reaffirmed its holding in Uniloc that
the entire-market-value rule cannot be circumvented by applying a very
small, reduced royalty rate to the broader revenue source.75 The court
indicated that, so long as an appropriately narrow base is selected, the
dispute the over pricing of that base is a question of fact for the jury.7 6
In sum, "in any case involving multi-component products, patentees
may not calculate damages based on sales of the entire product, as
opposed to the smallest salable patent-practicing unit, without
showing that the demand for the entire product is attributable to the
patented feature."77
70. LaserDynarnics, 694 F.3d at 66.
71. Id. at 68 (citation omitted).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. See id. at 67-68.
76. See id. at 78-79. On the latter issue, in Whitserve, the Federal Circuit reached a similar
result. See Whitserve, LLC v. Computer Packages, Inc., 694 F.3d 10 (Fed. Cir. 2012), cert. denied,
133 S. Ct. 1291 (2013). There, the court rejected an argument that a damages expert's estimate
for average service fees inappropriately applied business-wide revenues and swept in non-
infringing uses. See id. at 27-28. To the Federal Circuit, the average amount for the service fee
($15.69 versus $41) was a question of fact for the jury and not "impermissible speculation." ld. at
28-29.
77. LaserDynamics, 694 F.3d at 67-68 (emphasis added).
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D. Versata Software, Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc.-Comparable Units
Can Substitute as the Royalty Base
As the next evolution in this area, in Versata Software, Inc. v. SAP
America, Inc., decided in 2013, the Federal Circuit affirmed a Texas
jury's damages award of $260 million in lost profits and $85 million in
royalties because the award was "supported by substantial evidence."78
On appeal, the defendant argued that the Texas jury's award of $85
million in royalties violated the entire-market-value rule.79 in an
interesting twist, the district court precluded the patentee's expert from
presenting evidence related to royalties.so Instead, the jury heard
evidence from the defendant's expert that comparable software "had an
average per customer royalty of $133,200."81' The defendant's expert
opined that "the reasonable royalty rate should be around $2 million in
a lump-sum payment,"82 a far cry from the $85 million actually
awarded.
During cross-examination, a defense witnesses confirmed that his
calculations yielded $133,200 per customer and that the defendant had
around 1,300 sales after discarding sales attributable to lost profits.83
From there, the following interplay arose:
Q. So, if the jury believed that your per-customer royalty rate
[of $133,200] should be applied to every infringing sale
instead of just twelve [sales], then the number is not $2
million but $170 million.
A. That would be the correct math.84
Writing for the panel, Chief Judge Randall Rader began the
court's analysis by stating that "[t]he entire market value rule is a
narrow exception to the general rule that royalties are awarded based
on the smallest salable patent-practicing unit."" Reviewing the record,
78. Versata Software, Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 717 F.3d 1255, 1268 (Fed. Cir. 2013), cert.
denied, 134 S. Ct. 1013 (2014).
79. Id
80. See id. at 1260 ("With respect to reasonable royalties, the district court precluded
Versata from putting forward its damages model.").
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1267.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. (citing LaserDynamics, Inc. v. Quanta Computer, Inc., 694 F.3d 51, 67 (Fed. Cir.
2012)). Judge Rader served as Chief Circuit Judge until 2014. Randall Ray Rader, Biographical
Entry in History of the Federal Judiciary, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/servlet
/nGetlnfo?jid=1952&cid-999 (last visited June 26, 2015).
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Judge Rader determined that the expert did not apply the royalty rate
to "the entire value" of the infringing products.86 Rather, the rate was
applied to the value of a comparable product's sales and therefore
"merely accounted for all infringing sales."" So "the entire market
value exception was never triggered, and Versata was not required to
show that demand for hierarchical pricing drove demand for SAP's
product as whole."" According to the court, the jury used "common
sense and merely applied SAP's proposed royalty to a larger number of
infringing sales than SAP desired."89 Though not quite $170 million,
"the jury is not bound to accept the maximum proffered award and may
choose an intermediate rate," such as $85 million. 90 As Versata
demonstrates, a savvy litigant may be able to avoid the difficult hurdles
associated with the entire-market-value rule by simply substituting the
value of a comparable product juxtaposed with the sales of the actual
infringing product. Further, Judge Rader's opinion implicitly suggests
that reasonableness does not turn on how something is apportioned or
calculated necessarily; rather, it turns on how something is presented to
the jury. That understanding lays further groundwork for the
forthcoming opinions in 2014.
E. Evidentiary Burdens and Other Considerations
Before addressing the more recent jurisprudence on
apportionment, below are some additional thoughts on evidentiary
burdens spurred by these cases. Patentees seeking to rely on the entire
market value of a multicomponent product face a high evidentiary
hurdle. Indeed, given the increasing complexity of modern day
products, particularly in the electrical and mechanical spaces, it seems
unlikely that any one component could ever be the motivating basis for
consumer demand. But, despite the strict holdings in Lucent, Uniloc,
and LaserDynamics, courts nonetheless may be willing to allow the
issue to go to the jury if the patented feature is important and
substantially contributes to the value of the product as a whole.
In the lost profits context, in Funai Electric Co. v. Daewoo
Electronics Corp., the Federal Circuit upheld a jury award based on the
entire market value of VCR sales where the patented feature allowed
86. Versata, 717 F.3d at 1267.
87. Id.
88. Id
89. Id. at 1269.
90. Id.
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for "smaller, cheaper, faster, and more reliable" VCRs, all of which
were shown to be the basis for consumer demand.9 1 Specifically, the
patentee offered evidence demonstrating that each of the patents-in-suit
either "shrank the size of VCRs," "reduced costs and increased
reliability," or "enabled use of a high-performance motor that reduced
rewind speeds for VCR cassette tapes."92 Moreover, Funai established
that no non-infringing alternatives existed on the market.9 3
Similarly, in Marine Polymer Technologies Inc. v. HemCon, Inc.,
the patentee properly invoked the entire-market-value rule by
introducing "substantial evidence" of the accused features' importance
and significance to consumer demand.94 That evidence came from
multiple witnesses, including the defendant's president, that the
accused technology was "'critical' to the core hemostatic function of
the accused products."95 Though the damages award was ultimately
overturned because the entire-market-value rule was not met for all
accused products,96 the case demonstrates the type of testimony that
may be beneficial to invoke the rule.
Finally, consumer and market survey evidence should be
considered when seeking to invoke the entire-market-value rule. In
LaserDynamics, Judge Reyna signaled that market studies and
consumer surveys may be required to satisfy the rule by explicitly
noting that the patentee's expert "never conducted any market studies
or consumer surveys to ascertain whether the demand for a laptop
computer [was] driven by the patented technology."" If such evidence
is necessary, it most likely comes at the premium cost of retaining
another expert to develop and conduct a methodologically sound
consumer survey. Additionally, the need for third-party discovery may
be required to make the surveys statistically reliable to withstand
impeachment. Generally, that cost would be borne by the patentee and
any accused infringer seeking to offer a rebuttal. In some cases, there
may be little or no evidence that the patented feature is sufficiently
valuable. In other cases, the accused infringer may have to provide
discovery not only on the value of the accused component, but also
91. Funai Elec. Co. v. Daewoo Elecs. Corp., 616 F.3d 1357, 1375-76 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
92. Id.
93. See id at 1376.
94. Marine Polymer Techs. Inc. v. HemCon, Inc., 672 F.3d 1350, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en
banc).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 1370 (plurality opinion).
97. LaserDynamics, Inc. v. Quanta Computer, Inc., 694 F.3d 51, 69 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
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components, features, or functionality that actually drives demand to
ensure that the patentee's case is adequately rebutted.
As a natural progression from these cases, and as litigants
continued to carve up and apportion infringing products into tailor-
made pieces to support various damages theories, in 2014, the Federal
Circuit again took the opportunity to discuss what viable damages
arguments consist of and how those arguments should be presented to
juries. Those decisions addressed, among other things, the reach of
apportionment.
III. 2014: A BROADER VIEW OF REASONABLE ROYALTIES
Two Federal Circuit opinions issued in late 2014 that further
clarified how the concept of appointment can apply beyond the royalty
base. These two opinions arrive at a common-sense approach to royalty
calculations and provide the necessary guideposts for practitioners to
formulate a cogent litigation strategy for damages.
A. VirnetX, Inc. v. Cisco Systems, Inc.-Patentees Must Do
More
On September 16, 2014, the Federal Circuit vacated ajury's $368
million award after finding that apportionment to the smallest salable
patent-practicing unit was not necessarily sufficient to account for only
the contribution of the asserted patent.98 Though Chief Judge Sharon
Prost debunked the damages theories proffered by the patentee's
expert, the salient points come not from the rejection of those methods
but rather how the panel addressed what a suitable damages theory
would entail.99 Notwithstanding that the asserted claims were software-
oriented only, for the royalty base, the expert "undisputedly based his
calculations on the entire cost of [certain Apple] iOS devices, ranging
in value from $199 for the iPod Touch to $649 for the iPhone 4S."100
Stated differently, the expert considered whole devices as smallest
salable units, excluding only the additional costs associated with
components sold separately.o' When challenged for failing to extract
unpatented features from the base, the expert answered, "To the extent
98. VimetX, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., 767 F.3d 1308, 1314, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
99. Judge Prost assumed the duties of Chief Circuit Judge on May 30, 2014. See Sharon
Prost, ChiefCircuit Judge, U.S. CT. APP. FOR THE FED. CIR., http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/judges
/sharon-prost-chief-circuit-judge.htmI (last visited June 26, 2015)
100. VirnetX, 767 F.3d at 1328.
101. Id.
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that the products that we're talking about here contain additional
features, like additional memory, for instance, that Apple was charging
for, by using the lowest saleable unit, I'm doing as much as I can to
remove payments for those features."' 02
That testimony, among other things, doomed the patentee's
damages case because the base included unclaimed features (e.g.,
touchscreen, camera, processor, speaker, microphone, etc.) without
sufficient mitigating countermeasures.' 03
Rejecting an over-inclusive royalty base was not groundbreaking;
Judge Prost's analysis alongside that rejection, however, reinforces
what reasonable royalties have come to mean. Turning to the jury
instructions, Judge Prost observed that the instruction suggesting that a
jury may use the entire market value of a product when ascertaining a
base royalty amount was incorrect.1 04 Instead, unless the entire-market-
value rule is properly invoked, instructions (and experts) must discuss
apportionment to some degree:
[T]he instruction mistakenly suggests that when the smallest salable
unit is used as the royalty base, there is necessarily no further
constraint on the selection of the base. That is wrong. For one thing,
the fundamental concern about skewing the damages horizon-of
using a base that misleadingly suggests an inappropriate range-
does not disappear simply because the smallest salable unit is
used. 0
Judge Prost further explained that apportionment is not a
formalistic check or limitation:
In other words, the requirement that a patentee identify damages
associated with the smallest salable patent-practicing unit is simply
a step toward meeting the requirement of apportionment. Where the
smallest salable unit is, in fact, a multi-component product
containing several non-infringing features with no relation to the
patented feature (as VirnetX claims it was here), the patentee must
do more to estimate what portion of the value of that product is
attributable to the patented technology. To hold otherwise would
permit the entire market value exception to swallow the rule of
apportionment. 0 6
102. Id. (emphasis in original and citation omitted).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1327.
105. Id (emphasis added).
106. Id. at 1327-28 (emphasis added).
2015] 601
SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L..
Though some ambiguity remained about whether the Federal
Circuit required apportionment of the royalty base or whether
apportionment of the royalty rate would be permissible as well, the
court's underlying concerns were apparent-litigants must provide a
theory that is helpful to the jury and approximates the value of the
invention only. Indeed, "the patentee must do more to estimate the
value of that product is attributable to the patented technology"
foretells that it is all about substance (and not exclusively about that
base).107
B. Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Systems, Inc.-It's All About that
Base, Rate, or Any Combination Thereof
On December 4, 2014, in a standard-essential-patents case, the
Federal Circuit vacated a jury award of $10 million in damages
because, among other things, the lower court failed to properly instruct
the jury "that any royalty for the patented technology must be
apportioned from the value of the standard as a whole.""os In a complex
case involving the obligations of standard-essential-patent owners to
license under reasonable and non-discriminatory terms, when Judge
O'Malley turned to damages, her analysis made clear that
apportionment can occur between the royalty base and royalty rate in
tandem to achieve the underlying value of the invention:
As we explained recently in VirnetX, Inc. v. Cisco Systems, Inc.,
where multicomponent products are involved, the governing rule is
that the ultimate combination of royalty base and royalty rate must
reflect the value attributable to the infringing features of the product,
and no more....
When the accused infringing products have both patented and
unpatented features, measuring this value requires a determination
of the value added by such features. Indeed, apportionment is
required even for non-royalty forms of damages: a jury must
ultimately "apportion the defendant's profits and the patentee's
damages between the patented feature and the unpatented features"
using "reliable and tangible" evidence. Logically, an economist
could do this in various ways-by careful selection of the royalty
base to reflect the value added by the patented feature, where that
diferentiation is possible; by adjustment of the royalty rate so as to
107. Id.
108. Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc., 773 F.3d 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Judge Richard
Taranto dissented in part on an issue unrelated to calculating damages. Id. at 1237 (Taranto, J.,
dissenting in part).
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discount the value of a product's non-patented features; or by a
combination thereof'
Rather than simply stopping at this proposition, the court went
further to suggest that, though mathematical logic allows
apportionment to occur in a variety ways, very real policy concerns
about how to appropriately present a case to a jury temper how to go
about apportioning value. For example, though there is no categorical
rule that a hubcap patent could not use the price of a truck as the base
even where the suggested royalty rate is very low, pragmatism
necessarily makes that arrangement difficult to manage. Here, the
concern lies not with the method to arrive at a particular amount-it
lies with the potential that the jury may not fully grasp why the rate
must be very low:
It is not that an appropriately apportioned royalty award could never
be fashioned by starting with the entire market value of a multi-
component product-by, for instance, dramatically reducing the
royalty rate to be applied in those cases-it is that reliance on the
entire market value might mislead the jury, who may be less
equipped to understand the extent to which the royalty rate would
need to do the work in such instances." 0
In the hypothetical case of the hubcap patent, if a premium
suspension or sound system boosts the value of the truck in a way that
is unrelated to the patent, ajury may inadvertently award a royalty that
reflects value beyond the contribution of the invention. In that example,
perhaps combination apportionment is a better approach if individual
hubcap pricing is unobtainable or speculative. This logic is grounded
in the Federal Circuit's reasoning that, "[i]n each case, district courts
must assess the extent to which the proffered testimony, evidence, and
arguments would skew unfairly the jury's ability to apportion the
damages to account only for the value attributable to the infringing
features.""' So, while Ericsson resolved the debate about what could
be apportioned, its practical effects still linger for practitioners to
ponder.
Though a broader view of acceptable methodologies for
calculating damages presents greater opportunity and latitude when
presenting a damages case, a two-fold concern also has surfaced in the
wake of these cases. For some, a patentee's burden to prove damages
109. Id at 1226 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
110. Id. at 1227.
111. Id. at 1228.
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has become too onerous.l 12 Even the Federal Circuit has observed that
arriving at a value for patented features "can be an exceedingly difficult
and error-prone task."ll3 And, even if a party is willing to invest the
time and effort necessary to carefully apportion the patented features at
issue, the next daunting challenge involves packaging the information
in a manner that is both helpful to juries and able to withstand judicial
scrutiny. Taken to an extreme, this inherent uncertainty when carving
out what to apportion and where to apportion may give some patentees
pause before ever bringing a lawsuit.114
Despite those positions, any cognizable chilling effect in the wake
VirnetX and Ericsson is assuaged by understanding and embracing that
apportionment is an art and not an exact science. Progressively, with
each opinion, the Federal Circuit dispels misgivings by homing in on
the central issue when awarding damages-what is a helpful, realistic
starting point for a jury when calculating royalties:
[W]here the entire value of a machine as a marketable article is
"properly and legally attributable to the patented feature," the
damages owed to the patentee may be calculated by reference to that
value. Where it is not, however, courts must insist on a more realistic
starting point for the royalty calculations by juries-often, the
smallest salable unit and, at times, even less.' I
The Federal Circuit has acknowledged that determining a
reasonable royalty can involve "some degree of approximation and
uncertainty,"" 6 and that tension should be met with increasing
tolerance as technology and science become more complex. And
although the appellate court has recognized "the difficulty that
112. See, e.g., The Federal Circuit's VirnetX Ruling Continues Its Focus on Requirements
for Proving Patent Damages, BROOKS KUSHMAN (Sept. 30, 2014),
http://www.brookskushman.com/News/NewsDetails/tabid/95/articleType/ArticeView/articleld/
346/The-Federal-Circuits-VimetX-Ruling-Continues-Its-Focus-On-Requirements-For-Proving
-Patent-Damages.aspx ("Patentees arguing for a reasonable royalty measure of damages likely
will face increased difficulty in using completed product sales as a royalty base. Parties also
should expect the court to carefully review evidence attempting to prove that a patented
technology is the basis for customer demand for the product.").
113. LaserDynamics, Inc. v. Quanta Computer, Inc., 694 F.3d 51, 66 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
114. See, e.g., Jorgenson & Blumenkopf, supra note 3 ("Although since largely reversed,
this case demonstrates the uncertainties in establishing damages evidence and theories that will
pass muster under still-evolving legal standards."); Decker, supra note 3 ("Those decisions are
among recent cases illustrating patent owners' challenges making money from royalty payments
and litigation instead of manufacturing products.").
115. Ericsson, 773 F.3d at 1227 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (citation omitted).
116. VirnetX, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc. 767 F.3d 1308, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
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patentees may face in assigning value to a feature that may not have
ever been individually sold," the standard thrust on patentees has never
been "absolute precision."I17 Still, the paradox is that it may not be
sufficient to apply the letter of a Federal Circuit opinion on damages in
one case directly to another case if the facts, circumstances, and
economic realities are dissimilar. Perhaps, as Professors Fischl and Paul
taught in their book on law school exams, no one size fits all. But
practitioners who understand the conceptual points of VrnetX and
Ericsson should be equipped to navigate latent exclusion issues. To
those advocates, the question is not what can be apportioned-the focus
lies in how different sets of data can be apportioned to arrive at a
methodology that is helpful to the jury and true to the facts and
circumstances of the case.
CONCLUSION
The trend in recent damages jurisprudence is relatively clear:
damages theories must be reliable and clearly tailored to the particular
facts of each case. Though the specific legal standards designed to
achieve those goals are still evolving, clarity is on the horizon for
perceptive practitioners ready to seize upon the Federal Circuit's
guidance in VirnetX and Ericsson. Lawyers with the gumption to
advocate in a deliberate manner in the face of uncertainty will benefit.
More than ever, determining the most advantageous damages strategy
in a particular case requires careful, strategic analysis. Trial preparation
will demand the availability of, and willingness to pursue, additional
discovery and a highly credible damages expert. As a result, litigants
can expect to spend more time and resources on damages issues. But,
for those advocates who effectively grasp the "getting to maybe"
aspects of damages, a winning damages strategy is, quite simply, one
that is reasonable and realistic in light of the facts and circumstances of
each case-and nothing more. And for that, a trial team is limited only
by its resources and creativity to arrive at a sound course of action.
117. Id.
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